Chapter 5

One Head Is Better than Two

The Aphoristic Afterlife of Renaissance Tragedy

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In *Forms of Nationhood*, Richard Helgerson argues that “discursive forms matter, that they have a meaning and effect that can sometimes complement but that can also contradict” a given text’s “manifest content. Forms in this view are as much agents as they are structures. They make things happen.” This essay takes up the idea of forms as agents, emphasizing in particular not only what they make happen, especially when they presume to predict outcomes, but also what possibilities they foreclose. I begin with the observation that some Renaissance tragedies chart the process by which two equal powers fight for dominance and divide the loyalties of subordinates; order can be restored only when one of the two emerges as a victor. According to this logic, equality is not only impossible but chaotic and destructive; collective governance, divided kingdoms, multiple sexual partners, and plural gods inevitably lead to catastrophe. Just as a body can have only one head or one heart, this logic goes, so order requires that collectives must have a single leader and that no man should be asked to serve two masters.

Through readings of *Gorboduc*, *Antony and Cleopatra*, and *Coriolanus*, I will uncover how a deep distrust of plural attachments and allegiances structures the plots. In the course of the plays, competitions between mighty opposites rend protagonists into pieces, foster adulteries and divided duties, breed war, and shatter order. Although friendship between members of the same sex has often been held up as the model for egalitarian love relations in the period, these plays all suggest that homosocial relationships between brothers, warriors, and coleaders operate by the logic that one person must be the head when two form a partnership, a logic associated with male headship in marriage.

This tragic teleology persists into the present through the formal agency of aphorisms that survive to us from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
These aphorisms include “too many cooks spoil the broth” and “two captains will sink a ship,” among many others. They compress the specific tragic plot I consider—by which two equal authorities become murderous antagonists—into a terse and pessimistic prediction about how a particular kind of partnership will end. To trace this “common sense” about human relations to the early modern period is not to legitimate or explain it. Rather, I hope to challenge the claim that the early modern period fostered radically new and more egalitarian models of friendship, marriage, and political affiliation. This is the “inescapably progressive” argument Helgerson both makes and resists in his *Adulterous Alliances*. I want to challenge Helgerson’s claim that “things have changed” in order to argue that there are more continuities between the present and the early modern period than we might want to admit. Those continuities have to do with the tenacious structure of (male) rivalry that Helgerson himself so astutely assesses. The prediction that partnership will become rivalry is so insistent, I argue, that it “makes things happen” even now by presuming to tell us how the relationship between two cooks or captains will play out.

While the assumption that two equal powers will war to determine supremacy did not originate in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England it did acquire a particular urgency following the Reformation and during the Tudor and Stuart regimes. This assumption informs theorizations of the changing relationships between spiritual and temporal power, pope and sovereign. Henry VIII’s assertion that he was himself the Supreme Head of a Church of England sought to resolve a perceived conflict in the allegiances of subjects owing fealty to a sovereign and a pope. In so describing his stature, Henry drew on the already well-established use of an organic analogy between body and state that worked to naturalize the supremacy of one head and to cast as monstrous the possibility of two. His proposal that a unification of spiritual and temporal power would resolve conflicts for subjects also drew on the assumption that no man can serve two masters—as Jesus warns in the Sermon on the Mount—and therefore two masters will divide the allegiances of subjects and will inevitably lead to competition and conflict between the “heads.” This competition was sometimes construed in erotic terms. The monogamous subject pledged fealty to the monarch alone; the subject who attempted to sustain allegiance to both pope and sovereign was either bigamous or adulterous. Obviously, the problem of two heads was not resolved by Henry’s break with Rome.

In 1606, for example, Edward Forset insists that “it were utterly impossible, or insuffrable mischevious, to admit any partnership in the regall dignitie. Let us imagine a bodie so monstrous, as whereunto two heads were at once affixed, shall not that bodie receive much damage by the division and
confusion of those two heads?” Julie Crawford concludes of this passage that, “through the image of a two-headed monster, Forset, a man unequivocally loyal to James, makes it clear that English subjects must have allegiance to only one head: the King of England, not the Pope of Rome.” However various their applications, analogies to the body often work to uphold the head’s preeminence and privileges and to insist that couples, households, countries, and collectives, like bodies, should only have one (just as they have only one heart).

The twin assumptions that two heads will compete for dominance and that no person has room in his or her heart to love two equally are at the root of the dilemmas female monarchs posed because their relations to their husbands could only be imagined in hierarchical terms. According to John Knox, for instance, a woman cannot give advice or power to her husband “because it is against the nature of her kind, being the inferior member to presume to give anything to her head.” Mary Tudor’s marriage to Philip II of Spain can be seen as a failed experiment in outwitting the hierarchical logic of this figuration. At first, the two monarchs made attempts to symbolize their joint or shared power through a crown floating above and between them on coins or the two swords carried before them at the opening of parliament; in early portraits, they were seated at equal height. But, over time, Philip achieved symbolic preeminence; in portraits, he alone bore a sword and sat on “the pre-eminent throne.” According to Judith Richards, “one fundamental problem in this royal match was the difficulty of conceiving a marriage between equals.” For kings, a queen consort is a supplement, adding to their power a means of securing both dynastic alliances and legitimate heirs. For a queen regnant, a husband threatened to become a rival or substitute head. While, as has been much discussed, there were pressures on Elizabeth I to marry, Mary Tudor’s precedent was one reason that many people viewed Elizabeth’s possible marriage as entailing loss or diminution. Arguing against the French marriage, for instance, Sir Philip Sidney described the queen as already complete in herself: “To your estate, what can be added to the being an absolute born, and accordingly respected, princess?”

Sidney challenges the celebration of addition and multiplication that underpins defenses of marriage. Francis Meres calls this “Gods Arithmeticke” by which “Two are better then one,” as Ecclesiastes 4:9–12 advises; he opposes this to the devil’s arithmetic of division and subtraction. Yet Meres warns that two are only better if the wife is a helpmate for her husband. If she is not, “then can I not say that two are better then one, but that one is better then two, and that it were good for such a man to be alone.” In short, two are not better if they are both heads. In Matrimoniall Honour (1642), Daniel Rogers warns that “Two heads in a family confound all.” There were many arguments
in favor of male rather than dual (let alone female) headship in marriage, including those that upheld hierarchy as the ordered form of all relations and those that insisted on gender complementarity and difference. Both before and after the Reformation, we also find discourses that promote marital or at least spiritual equality, although they are riven with contradictions. What I want to emphasize here is that early modern marriage advice often claims that husband and wife cannot be equal partners simply because it will lead to rivalries. Two heads divide their subjects’ allegiances and struggle with one another for dominance. Thomas Hobbes concedes that mothers and fathers have, by nature, equal dominion over their children but that it is “impossible” to regard the child as “equally subject to both” because “there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between the man and the woman, as that right can be determined without war.”

Robert Whitehall, too, advises that if women “were . . . admitted to co-equal sway in a Domestic Kingdome, [they] would presently begin to aspire at Absolute monarchy.”  

The limiting logic that one is better than two also runs in the other direction—restricting bodies as well as heads. As Nathaniel Hardy explains “The Ring given in Marriage is but one, to teach the man that his love must be singularly contracted to the person of the Wife: the truth is, that love which is as it were cut into many rivulets must needs run weakly, nay, he that giveth not all his love to his wife indeed giveth none at all.” Francis Meres limits his celebration of marital addition to two; in marriage, three is “starke naught.” James I used the taboo against polygamy, which was first made a felony in 1604, to explain why he needed to unite Scotland and Britain into one kingdom: It is “no more possible . . . for one king to govern two countries contiguous, . . . than for one head to govern two bodies, or one man to be husband to two wives.” As has been widely argued, assertions about the common sense of marriage are inevitably assertions about the possibilities for other forms of relation as well, including “mixed monarchies” and united kingdoms. We find the same assumption about how relations between two equal powers will unfold across a wide field of relationships in the early modern period. Commonsensical advice about the importance of a single leader ultimately supports monogamous and hierarchical dyads in which the man is the uncontested head; monotheism; monarchy; and a single head of both church and state so that the two will not be at odds. This suspicion of two heads generates the plots in many tragedies, three of which I will now examine.

Thomas Sackville and Thomas Norton’s *The Tragedie of Ferrex and Porrex* or *Gorboduc* (1562; printed 1565, 1570–1) is a tragedy precisely because it is about multiple protagonists, rather than one, and the division of a kingdom. *Gorboduc* has often been dismissed as too clumsy and overt a lecture to Elizabeth I about the dangers of an uncertain succession. It has been
argued to be a bad play because of its long stiff speeches as well as its missing or multiple protagonists, two authors, and two audiences whose interests did not always align—Elizabeth and the Inns of Court men, a queen and her counselors. But Joel Altman argues that the play’s doubleness and division, built into its very structure, signal not a failure but rather the play’s purpose. Altman describes this play about dividing one kingdom between two sons as one that “falls into two parts,” preaches “two morals,” and is actually “two tragedies—a demonstrative tragedy of moral error . . . and a tragedy of fate perceived only by the hero.” Altman emphasizes that the play’s “ambivalences” are not a result of dual authorship, as some have argued, but of the playwrights’ shared project of exploring opposing views. 18

The monarchs in the play, King Gorboduc and Queen Videna, are married (although they never appear on stage together) and they have two male heirs. Their story, whatever it was supposed to teach Elizabeth, suggests that marrying and bearing children is no guarantee of future peace. King Gorboduc initiates a tragic sequence of events when he divides the kingdom between his two sons, Ferrex and Porrex, stating, reasonably, that “My love extendeth egally to both;/My land sufficeth for them both also” (1.2.343–44, sig. Cv).19 Why not, then, divide the land evenly between the two? His counselors debate whether primogeniture is natural or unnatural, making intellectually compelling arguments in favor of the course that the play ultimately positions as the catalyst of disaster. The advisor who counsels King Gorboduc to divide his kingdom, Philander, argues that doing so would make more sense than favoring one son over another, as primogeniture requires. He says that brothers ruling jointly will rule “not as two, but one of doubled force”; brothers are so equal in their claims that primogeniture will “throw the brother subject under feet/Of him whose peer he is by course of kind” (1.2.176, 184–5, sig. B3). However, Eubulus, the King’s secretary, advises that “Within one land one single rule is best:/Divided reigns do make divided hearts” (1.2.259–260, sig. B4v).

Such is in man that greedy mind to reign,
So great is his desire to climb aloft,
In worldly stage the stateliest parts to bear,
That faith and justice and all kindly love
Do yield unto desire of sovereignty
Where egal state doth raise an egal hope
To win the thing that either would attain. (1.2.262–68, sig. B4v)

To share power is to divide rather than double strength. The play’s plot supports Eubulus’s logic. Equality readily becomes rivalry: Porrex, the younger son, kills Ferrex, the elder; Queen Videna, who opposed Gorboduc’s scheme
from the start because she favored her eldest son, kills Porrex as her own bloody solution to the problem of two equal offspring; finally, the people rise against and kill Gorboduc and Videna.

Critics have pointed out that Sackville and Norton, both members of the Privy Council, make counselors the heroes of their story and seem to favor divesting the sovereign of certain prerogatives so as to confer them on the council.20 The Inns of Court setting of the play’s first performance should remind us that lateral, collaborative models of networking and powersharing were available in the period, making it possible to imagine “relatively horizontal forms of political relation.”21 Anne McLaren describes Elizabeth’s relationship to her counselors as constituting a “bicephalic body politic.” It is possible to read Gorboduc as staging and promoting such shared governance.22 The play’s conclusion suggests that only a succession secured by Parliament could prevent civil wars and the anarchy by which “subjects will be kings” (5.2.245). This would be a “mixed monarchy” to be sure, and one in which counselors figure importantly. But the play’s last speaker, Eubulus, argues that parliament can only function when a monarch forestalls its members’ ambitions. Otherwise, they will all compete to lead. Eubulus closes the play with a threat: that only a single ruler and a certain, rightful heir waiting in the wings can prevent mayhem.23 Without this certainty, anyone with ambition will enter the open, destructive contest for supremacy: “Who seeth not now how many rising minds/Do feed their thoughts with hope to reach a realm?” (5.2.193–96).

Critics have helped to position Gorboduc in the court complexities of the winter of 1561–2 and have debated what advice it proposed to offer the queen and her counselors.24 Although the play’s twinned statements—that “divided reigns do make divided hearts” for subjects and that, at the top, “equall state doth raise an equall hope”—emerge from only one side in a dialogic debate staged at a particular moment for two very particular audiences, they achieved a tenacious afterlife in part because they are both predictions. As predictions, they apply not only to Elizabeth but also to the kind of men who wrote the play and the destructive consequences their claims to equal-ness might have.

The relationship between tragic plots and the distrust of shared power and equal claims is particularly evident in two of Shakespeare’s late tragedies about erotic and political relationships, Antony and Cleopatra (1607) and Coriolanus (1607–8). Many critics have addressed the divisions at the core of Antony and Cleopatra, especially as they rend or strand Anthony: the play has two titular protagonists, two locations, multiple claims on Antony’s loyalties, and battles by land and by sea.25 In part because of what might be called an equilibrium, the play has often been charged with lacking coherence and with straying uncomfortably into comedy.26
The play begins with two triangles that we might attempt to distinguish as erotic and political: Antony, his wife (first Fulvia then Octavia), and Cleopatra; and the triumvirate of Antony, Lepidus, and Caesar. But by 3.5 Lepidus is in jail and out of the action; by 3.6 Octavia has made her last appearance. Ultimately, the triangle in the play consists of Antony, Octavius Caesar, and Cleopatra. The play suggests that Antony finds an equal in both and that this parity cannot hold in either case.

Antony describes himself and Cleopatra as “a mutual pair” and “peerless” (1.1.39, 42); Caesar claims that “no grave upon the earth shall clip in it/A pair so famous” (5.2.349–50). While Cleopatra has no peer other than Antony (except possibly Caesar who never acknowledges her as such), the play constantly depicts Caesar as Antony’s equal and therefore his rival. It is that pairing on which I want to focus. After his death, Caesar praises Antony as his “competitor” and “mate in empire” (5.1.42–43); in this play, to be a mate is to be a competitor and to be competitors is to be locked in a fight to the death: “we could not stall together in the whole world” (5.1.39–40). Caesar laments “that our stars,/Unreconcilable, should divide/Our equalness to this” (5.1.46–8).

Coppelia Kahn argues that Octavius and Antony’s “contest for mastery is at least as important in Shakespeare’s play as the love story.” I agree. Kahn says of Octavius and Antony that “their ‘equalness’ spawns a relentless striving for its opposite, the ultimate difference of total victory and total defeat: that is the paradox at the heart of emulation.” Kahn focuses on martial masculinity. My argument is not that the play is structured around male rivalry as much or more than heterosexual love but that it suggests that to be equals, whatever one’s sex, is to be rivals. All relations among equals, of the same or opposite sexes, are all-or-nothing contests for mastery that can only be resolved when one person comes out on top.

In a passage I take as a powerful expression of the dynamic on which I’m focusing, the Soothsayer warns Antony that he is only peer-less outside of Caesar’s orbit.

Thy daemon, that thy spirit which keeps thee, is
Noble, courageous, high, unmatchable,
Where Caesar’s is not. But near him thy angel
Becomes afeard, as being o’erpowered. Therefore
Make space enough between you. (2.3.16–21)
If thou dost play with him at any game,
Thou art sure to lose; and of that natural luck
He beats thee ‘gainst the odds. Thy lustre thickens
When he shines by. I say again, thy spirit
Is all afraid to govern thee near him;
But he away, ’tis noble. (2.3.23–8)
To be near one who is equally powerful, who is one’s match, is to be in constant danger of being overpowered, outshone, eclipsed. As Kahn points out, this speech makes the rivalry between the two “seem fated.” Since the soothsayer predicts the future he insists that equality will become rivalry, that rivalry will be fatal, and that one cannot make meeting one’s match mean anything else.

Like *Gorboduc*, *Antony and Cleopatra* focuses on the disastrous consequences for subordinates. Antony explains to Cleopatra regarding Pompey and Caesar that: “Equality of two domestic powers/Breed scrupulous faction” (1.3.47–48). Enobarbus calls Caesar and Pompey a “pair of chops” (3.5.12) that grind one another—and whatever comes between. Octavia, torn between her brother, Caesar, and her husband, Antony, laments the terrible position into which the dynastic marriage has thrust her: “Ay me most wretched,/That have my heart parted betwixt two friends/That does afflict each other!” (3.6.76–78). Octavia imagines her dilemma as world-splitting: “Wars ’twixt you twain would be/As if the world should cleave, and that slain men/Should solder up the rift” (3.4.30–32). Antony and Caesar both tell her she must choose betwixt the twain. According to Antony, “When it appears to you where this [conflict] begins/Turn your displeasure that way, for our faults/Can never be so equal that your love/Can equally move with them (3.4.33–36). In short, he insists, the divided heart can only become whole by choosing one over the other; no claims are so equal that one cannot, when pressed, choose. This does not have to be the case; insisting that there is no way between two extremes, and no way outside of them, is part of tragic form’s narrowing of possibilities.

*Antony and Cleopatra* memorably locates its conflicts in the relationships between the sexes, describing the pleasures of meeting one’s match and surrendering one’s “sword Philippan” to her, or the hopelessly divided heart of a wife and sister torn between enemies who make equal claims on her love and obedience. But the play draws our attention to a set of expectations about relations of intimacy and of power that can apply to dyads of the same or opposite sexes. The two captains who sink ships in *Antony and Cleopatra* might be a man and woman or two men. We can also see this in *Coriolanus*.

*Coriolanus* is a play about a singular, even inassimilable hero, but one who has two names, is associated with two places, and fights for two different sides. In this play, as in *Antony and Cleopatra*, the erotic and the political are inseparable and dispiritingly restrictive. The play vividly depicts a republic but one Coriolanus scorns to join. According to Stanley Cavell, “what alarms him is simply being part, one member among others of the same organism;” Jonathan Dollimore claims that “Coriolanus has an almost manic fear that his oneness will be obliterated by the many.” The play depicts the relationship
between the one and the many by analogy to the body. Memorably, Menenius tells the citizens of Rome “a pretty tale” to justify what they perceive as the patricians’ hoarding of grain. In this fable of a body politic, he positions the patricians as the belly, distributing nourishment to ungrateful and “mutinous members.” Menenius reveals that the body is a hierarchy more than a collective when he asks his most resistant listener, the First Citizen, “What do you think,/You, the great toe of this assembly?” (1.1.143–44). If the first citizen is the “great toe” of this body politic, and the patricians the belly, who is the head? What possible place can there be in a republic for a warrior as imperious and superior as Coriolanus except alone and at the top? When they are stirring up the people against Coriolanus, the cynical tribunes, Brutus and Sicinius, accuse him of “affecting one sole throne/Without assistance” (4.6.33–34). Menenius says he thinks that is not the case and it does not seem to be. It is accurate not as a statement of Coriolanus’s ambition but of his singularity.

In *Coriolanus*, in short, the fable is as much about the head as it is about the belly. For all of *Coriolanus*’ emphasis on the complexities of collective governance, in its explorations of the relationships among warriors it repeats the assumption that equality inevitably devolves into a rivalry in which the achievements of one tarnish the achievements of the other. This is especially clear in Coriolanus’ relationship to Aufidius. Martius/Coriolanus first describes Aufidius as a secondary ideal: “were I anything but what I am,/I would wish me only he.” He also anticipates that his engagement with Aufidius will require a revolt from Rome: “I’d revolt to make/Only my wars with him. He is a lion/That I am proud to hunt” (1.1.222–23, 225–27). For Janet Adelman, Coriolanus’ “need to create a man who is his equal is in fact one of the most poignant elements in the play” in part because it prevents Coriolanus from seeing Aufidius’s ruthlessness. It’s also poignant because embracing Aufidius as an equal is not a respite from their antagonism but a catalyst for it.

There have been many powerful, persuasive readings of act 4, scene 5. In this scene, Aufidius rapturously greets Coriolanus after his banishment from Rome as a more rousing sight than his wife on his wedding night, explaining that he dreams nightly of further “encounters” with him. To offer just a small sample, Janet Adelman argues that Coriolanus’ “union with an alter ego,” Aufidius, “represents a flight from the world of Rome and his mother toward a safe male world;” Stanley Cavell counters that “Coriolanus’s erotic attachment to battle and to men suggests a search for the father as much as an escape from the mother;” and Jonathan Goldberg interrogates how hard critics have worked to avoid the possibility that Aufidius might himself be the object of Coriolanus’s longing. Aufidius’ nightly dreams of encounters
can recur only because they end without definitive resolution. I am interested in how the fantasy of equality Aufidius and Coriolanus share—a dream in which each warrior feels he meets his match—is unsustainable because what they dream of doing is defeating or killing the beloved rival. As Menenius predicts, “He and Aufidius can no more atone/Than violent’st contrariety” (4.6.75–76).

Aufidius’s subordinates view his union with Coriolanus as compromising his authority. As a servant reports, “our general himself makes a mistress of him, sanctifies himself with’s hand, and turns up the white o’th’ eye to his discourse. But the bottom of the news is, our general is cut i’th’ middle, and but one half of what he was yesterday; for the other has half by the entreaty and grant of the whole table” (4.5.193–98). Aufidius, who greeted Coriolanus as more loved, more welcome, than “the maid I married,” “makes a mistress of him” but, in that process, is himself diminished and divided. What Aufidius first celebrates as gain he comes to experience as loss. Aufidius’s Lieutenent warns him that he is “dark’ned” or eclipsed by his league with Coriolanus. He says it would have been better to have acted alone or even to have left the military action against Rome to Coriolanus “solely.” The problem is having “joined in commission” (4.7.5, 14–16). Aufidius complains that they began “joint-servants” but rapidly “I seemed his follower, not partner” (5.6.31, 38). Ultimately he redresses this by renewing himself in his rival’s fall and ignominious death on the swords of multiple conspirators. As we have seen in Antony and Cleopatra, it is almost impossible to imagine that one can sustain a partnership; rivalry soon exalts one as the leader and demotes the other to follower or eliminates him altogether. The fatal conclusion to their alliance confirms Coriolanus’ own earliest political intuition that “when two authorities are up/Neither supreme . . . confusion” will “enter ‘twixt the gap of both and take/The one by th’other” (3.1.112–5). In the imaginative world of this play, equality creates conflict while hierarchy resolves it and preserves order.

In all three of the plays I have discussed, collectives (councilors, soldiers, and citizens) are crucial players. These plays could thus be read as suggesting that hierarchy, rather than equality, breeds rivalry, and that the collective component of a mixed monarchy stabilizes it by diminishing or eliminating fierce, individualized contests at the top. One might also say that tragedy, dedicated to mourning obsolete but valued structures, laments divisive rivalries between kings and warriors, and the hopeless dilemmas of those torn between them, as part of the process of dismantling this system so as to clear the space for something new.35 Considerable imaginative energy and political action went into conceiving and achieving republics and other forms of equitable association in this period.36 Yet these dramatic, even revolutionary,
developments did not wholly supersede hierarchical and one-headed models of association. Neither “many heads are better than one” nor “no heads are better than two” appear in dictionaries of proverbs and aphorisms. I focus on the dyad not to naturalize it as the essential unit of affiliation but rather to suggest that it has been culturally constructed as divided against itself.

Some have argued that same-sex friendship offered one model for the intimacy possible between equals, a model freed of assumptions about gender hierarchy, before a “companionate marriage” between opposite-sex spouses could yet be imagined without contradiction or terror. But in discourses of male friendship we find the same fear that equality degenerates into murderous enmity that characterizes many early modern descriptions of marriage. Perhaps the insistence on the dangers of such “equalness” sought to ward off its considerable attractions and its radical political implications. My point is not that equality was wholly unthinkable as an ideal in the early modern period but that it remains an emergent ideal today. Fear of “equalness” and the confusion it unleashes still crops back up in surprising places despite the assumption that at some point mutuality, reciprocity, and egalitarianism replaced hierarchy as mainstream western cultural values.

The plot trajectory by which two equal protagonists become rivals or antagonists and either one triumphs over the other or both die in the struggle survives in a truncated or crumpled form as an aphorism. The aphorisms still in use that distill the logic I’ve been considering include the ones I’ve already mentioned: “too many cooks spoil the broth” and “Two captains will sink a ship” as well as “If (or when) two ride on a horse, one must ride behind,” which Dogberry articulates in Much Ado About Nothing. But these survive from a much richer field of early modern sayings, including: “Two cats and a mouse, two wives in one house, two dogs and a bone, never agree in one;” “Two kings in one kingdom do not agree well together;” “two of a trade can never agree;” “two sparrows on one ear of corn cannot agree;” “Where every man is master the world goes to wrack;” and “One master in a house is enough.” In each is compressed the logic of the plots I’ve examined, that two with equal claims or powers will fight to determine which one will be on top. In aphoristic form, this particular plot prophesies how particular relationships will turn out, how certain kinds of stories will end. These aphorisms are all warnings, anticipating tragic outcomes, whether spoiled broth or a sunken ship, and presuming to know what will happen between two people. Through them, conventional wisdom conserves a hierarchical way of imagining relationships.

Understanding how the past is installed in the language we use in the present and through which we presume to predict the future requires temporal models that are neither teleological nor progressive; in a refusal of the
competitive logic on which I am focusing, such models require us to value and engage multiple temporalities at once in a kind of temporal polyamory.\textsuperscript{42} Michel de Certeau points to “the industry of the dead who, through a sort of kinetic energy, are silently perpetuated through the survival of former structures” and whom we must try to appease.\textsuperscript{43} Just as Certeau attributes “kinetic energy” to the dead, many others emphasize that our various, fragmentary, vibrant pasts are not dead yet. Dipesh Chakrabarty argues that because our pasts never disappear, “we live in time-knots” in which multiple periods are contemporaneous.\textsuperscript{44} In \textit{Specters of Marx}, Jacques Derrida proposes a “hauntology,” an attention to, even a call to engagement with, the unbidden, baffling spectral presence of the past, that has appealed to many critics of early modern literature, populated as it is by ghosts who make demands on the living. For Derrida, these ghosts do not represent an origin, nor can they or should they be put to rest.\textsuperscript{45} According to Margreta De Grazia, “circling erratically back and leaping precipitately ahead, ghosts belong less to a temporality and more to an ‘anachronicity’ or an ‘untimeliness’” that she terms a “loopy chronology.”\textsuperscript{46} Julia Rheinhard Lupton uses the term “afterlife,” meaning both “the half-life of radioactive decay, or the bacterial decomposition of dead matter” and a “‘side effect,’ the disturbing symptoms brought about by the work of cultural symbolization” to describe how “one layer [of sedimented time] can contaminate, wrinkle, or undermine a contiguous one. One era can obdurately survive into the period that has supposedly surpassed it.”\textsuperscript{47} Jonathan Gil Harris proposes as a temporal model the palimpsest, holding as it does two or more texts in tension, overlapping, but simultaneously present, to describe an “anachronic affinity”—rather than identity—between past and present or between different times and places.\textsuperscript{48} Linda Charnes talks about “‘worm holes’ between the ‘early modern’ era and our own” through which unacknowledged, unchosen legacies bear down on “puzzled legatees . . . entangled in ‘perpetual entail’ whether we like it or not” but also through which future investments crash into the past.\textsuperscript{49} Knots, ghosts, loops, afterlives, palimpsests, wormholes and legacies: these are not only figurations of a relationship between the past and the present in which each is equally powerful but also attempts to think beyond a dyadic model of relationship to imagine how multiple pasts can be contemporaneous.

Simultaneously now, then, and next, the particular aphorisms that interest me invite us to imagine a plot unspooling out of the structure of two equals and predict what trajectory that plot will follow. They telescope the movement from the set up to the conclusion rather than unfolding events in an ordered and protracted sequence, inviting us to imagine the future in spatial and temporal terms as the process by which two will become one or none. A past installed in a plot, then compressed into an aphorism, is both historically
grounded and portable. The aphorism as a tragedy in little thus functions as a kind of relic—not a “left-over” but a “thrown forward,” an agential object intervening in outcomes yet occluding the agency that creates those outcomes, and thus perhaps ultimately a “held back.”\textsuperscript{50} As Hannah Arendt says of Walter Benjamin’s collections of “thought fragments,” “the process of decay is at the same time a process of crystallization.”\textsuperscript{51}

I have chosen the word “aphorism” because “proverb” suggests the kind of timelessness I hope to trouble. But what Walter Benjamin says of the proverb applies to the aphorisms I discuss here. Benjamin describes the proverb as “an ideogram of a story”; “A proverb, one might say, is a ruin which stands on the site of an old story in which a moral twines about a happening like ivy around the wall.”\textsuperscript{52} Approaching this from the opposite angle, Kenneth Burke wonders whether the most “complex and sophisticated works of art” might be considered “proverbs writ large.”\textsuperscript{53} The aphorism as I am discussing it also resembles Jameson’s ideologeme, “the smallest intelligible unit” which can function as a “protonarrative” with “residual effectivity” so that, like the literary forms of which it is a miniature version, it “continues to emit its ideological signals long after its original content has become historically obsolete.”\textsuperscript{54}

The aphorism as a “protonarrative” about the outcome of relationships between equals is most often used with regard to marriage. I draw my final examples from American culture because the assumption that Americans promote rather than fear equality makes it hard for many people to acknowledge the continuities I want to uncover here. The prediction that equals inevitably become rivals informs aphoristic formulations by two writers of Christian marriage advice who are currently influential media figures. In one of his many books on marriage, Focus on the Family’s James Dobson summarizes that “two captains sink the ship and two cooks spoil the broth,” and, as a consequence, “a family must have a leader whose decisions prevail in times of differing opinions.”\textsuperscript{55} Tim LaHaye, one of the authors of the best-selling \textit{Left Behind} series of apocalyptic thrillers, writes (with his wife Beverly) that “after all, there can only be one authority, one general, one president of the corporation; “No organization can function properly if it has two heads.”\textsuperscript{56} Perhaps such assertions are unsurprising from evangelicals, who privilege male headship as “one of \textit{the} most defining and differentiating features of couples subscribing to a conservative Christian worldview” in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.\textsuperscript{57} But writers such as Dobson and LaHaye use aphorisms linking male headship to other forms of leadership—cooks and captains—in order to appeal to what they hope is a broadly shared “common sense” about effective or productive relationships. And it is broadly shared or at least oft-repeated, despite the many competing discourses of partnership and team work.
Very similar assumptions inform descriptions in supposedly hip venues of the daily power struggles of couples who might call themselves “partners.” For instance, an article in the New York Times food section called “He Cooks. She Stews. It’s Love” suggests that, in every couple’s kitchen, there is an “alpha cook” and a “beta cook;” as a consequence, “a man and a woman equally ruling a peaceful kitchen remains a fantasy;” “instead of a partnership, some couples say that their relationship in the kitchen more closely resembles a tiny dictatorship.” Even if women can be alphas and men betas, what doesn’t change is the alpha-beta structure itself. Why should this be the case? “This, of course, is the way it works in restaurants,” the article explains, where “the top-down system helps to avoid chaos, speeds the process and enforces quality control.” But in the home kitchen the alpha cook can rob the beta of any sense of competence and the beta can learn sly forms of retaliation through critique of the alpha’s cooking. As the article presents the situation, what seems difficult to imagine, let alone enact, is the idea of two equally competent cooks, or of happy collaborations. This article does not restrict its claims to heterosexual, married couples. But it elaborates on the aphorism James Dobson takes as a given—“two cooks spoil the broth”—revealing that it is neither outmoded nor restricted to marriage. In grim warnings like this one, the New York Times joins hands with Focus on the Family, and Renaissance tragedy creeps in to predict what will happen in your kitchen. To insure that this plot is history, we need both to recognize that it has a history and to resist its presumption to predict. The plot that two equals will war for dominance can make some things happen, and prevent others, when it is compressed into a predictive aphorism. But different dynamics might open up when we stop repeating these warnings as givens and refuse the invitation to assume we can know what will happen when two cooks or two captains decide to work together. In many ways, the story of equals who are not rivals is still to be imagined.

NOTES


29. Ibid., 113.

30. Shakespeare drew on Plutarch’s *Lives* for both *Antony and Cleopatra* and *Coriolanus*. Plutarch’s project is to play Greeks against Romans (Kahn 16–17). As Gordon Braden points out, “the puzzling habit of presenting paired lives makes the very business of biography competitive” (“Shakespeare’s Roman Tragedies,” *A Companion to Shakespeare’s Works I: The Tragedies*, ed. Richard Dutton and Jean E. Howard [Oxford: Blackwell, 2003], 199–218, esp. 217). Plutarch does not always resolve his pairs in favor of one or the other; from different worlds, they can remain parallel because they are not in the intimate proximity that produces or requires violent resolution in the dynamic I examine.


more than change I join the project of unseating difference as the defining term of historical work, but I also put pressure on the notion of sameness. Even two equal time-periods might find themselves in a struggle for dominance. As Bruno Latour argues, for instance, the word modern “designates a break in the regular passage of time, and it designates a combat in which there are victors and vanquished” (We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter [Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993], 10).


52. Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller,” Illuminations, 108. I am grateful to Joan Pong Linton for directing me to this essay.


